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This paper analyzes the impact of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) on sovereign bond returns of 25 emerging markets from 1993
to 2016. Under a BIT, foreign investors can use an international ar-
bitration scheme to enforce compensation claims against the domes-
tic government in case of direct or indirect expropriation. We focus
on the so far unexplored effects of legal risk associated with BITs
on sovereign creditworthiness. We find small unconditional effects of
BITs on sovereign bond returns. Taking the heterogeneity of BITs
and political regimes into account, we find robust and strong negative
effects. In countries with high political risk of expropriation (mea-
sured by low executive constraints), we find that the implementation
of investor-friendly BITs is associated with a significantly negative im-
pact on sovereign bond returns, accounting for roughly 15% of bond
returns’ standard deviation.
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A bilateral investment treaty (BIT) provides legal tools to regulate and structure investor-state dispute 
settlements (ISDS). Under the BIT, foreign investors of the home country can sue the government of 
the destination country if a foreign investment is directly or indirectly expropriated by the destination 
country government. A foreign investor can then use an international arbitration scheme court to enforce 
compensation claims and does not have to rely on domestic courts. In effect, the introduction of a BIT 
reduces the country risk for the foreign investor. A treaty increases the enforceability of compensation 
claims in the case of expropriation and commits the sovereign to pursue policies in accordance with 
treaty provisions. The literature has so far focused on the role of BITs to promote foreign investment. 
 
We aim to contribute to the literature by analyzing the impact of BITs on sovereign risk. The 
introduction of a BIT can increase the sovereign creditworthiness by attracting foreign investment and 
the associated positive effects on economic growth and tax revenues. The drawback of BITs may be 
deterioration of sovereign creditworthiness. BITs incur the legal risk of compensation claims under the 
BIT’s arbitration scheme if the domestic government breaches the treaty rules by expropriating foreign 
investors, withdrawing licenses, or restricting the business activities of foreign investors. 
 
In a prominent arbitral proceeding, Venezuela was sentenced to pay USD 8366.10 million in 
compensation for the direct expropriation of three oil production sites (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30). In 
another prominent case, Pakistan was found guilty of indirect expropriation for denying an agreed 
mining lease. In consequence Pakistan was ordered to pay USD 4087.00 million compensation (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/1). Furthermore, less obvious forms of expropriation can be sanctioned through BITs. 
Following Poland’s gambling law of 2009, the operation of slot machines outside of casinos was 
restricted. This destroyed the business model of a claimant and Poland was sentenced to pay USD 9.30 
million in compensation (PCA Case No. 2014-31). 
 
The introduction of BITs therefore constitutes an implicit increase of public expenditure due to the risk 
of international arbitration claims. If sovereign bond investors recognize this legal risk, the introduction 
of a BIT may be associated with a decrease in sovereign creditworthiness and a decline in sovereign 
bond returns. To isolate the legal risk channel of BITs, we control for the reaction of stock returns to 
BIT related news (aimed to measure to market reaction to positive growth enhancing effects of BITs). 
 
In order to account for the expected costs from arbitration claims against the domestic government, we 
exploit the cross-country variation in the government's political constraints and the investor-friendliness 
of the BITs. In particular, governments with low political constraints expropriate foreign investors more 
likely in order to gain political advantage. Additionally, potential compensation payments and reputation 
losses from arbitral proceedings are higher if a BIT is particularly investor-friendly. Foreign investors 
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are then more likely to assert their claims. The expected compensation payments awarded by arbitral 
tribunals should therefore be positively correlated with political constraints and investor-friendly BITs.  
 
We expect that treaties with low investment protection bear low risk of arbitral proceedings. However, 
those contracts will hardly spur foreign investments. Independent from a government’s political 
constraints, such BITs are unlikely to affect sovereign default risk. In contrast, treaties that provide 
extensive rights for foreign investors should attract additional investments from abroad. For the 
assessment of these treaties a government’s political constraints should be crucial. If a government is 
highly constrained by veto players, the risk of unlawful expropriations should be low. Potential 
compensation payments and losses of reputation from arbitral proceedings will be negligible. We expect 
the creditworthiness of a sovereign to improve and consequently the sovereign bond returns to increase 
in this case. In contrast, the risk of expropriation should be high if a home country’s government is 
hardly constrained by veto players. Potential compensation payments awarded by arbitral tribunals and 
losses of reputation are likely to be high. We expect the creditworthiness of a sovereign to deteriorate 
and sovereign bond returns to decrease in this case. 
 
To test the impact of BIT introductions on sovereign bond returns we use a daily panel dataset covering 
25 emerging markets in the period 1993-2016.We determine the effects of BITs at three different dates: 
The day of signature, the day of notification, and the day of entry into force. At the day of signature, 
investors learn about the existence of a BIT, but it remains unclear, whether the contract will ever 
become effective. At the date of notification, both countries have mutually confirmed the ratification of 
the BIT. At this day it becomes clear that the treaty will enter into effect. This date will presumable have 
the largest informational value for investors. At the last date, the BIT enters into force. In our baseline 
model we estimate the effect of these three events on sovereign bond returns. Our baseline models 
indicate a weak negative effect on sovereign bond returns on days of BIT notification, while no 
significant effects are detected on days of signature and entry into force. 
 
Using interaction models, we exploit the cross-country variation in political constraints and the investor-
friendliness of BITs to analyze the effects of BITs on sovereign bond returns. The investor-friendliness 
of treaties is measured using a hand coded index of treaty provisions that have been used most frequently 
in arbitral proceedings. Information on political constraints comes from the Polity IV dataset. We find 
that the introduction of an investor-friendly BIT in countries with low political constraints is associated 
with a -0.14% reduction in sovereign bond returns (which equals around 15% of the standard deviation 
of daily returns) in the three days surrounding notification. Thus, there is an economically sizable 
negative impact of BITs on sovereign’s perceived creditworthiness. This result suggests that countries 
with relatively unconstrained governments are more likely to expropriate foreign investors, which 
increases the risk of compensation payments in case of investor-friendly BITs. The negative effect is 
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even more pronounced (with a -0.22% reduction in sovereign bond returns) when the home country of 
the investor is large compared to the destination country. For large capital exporting countries such as 
the United States it is more likely that foreign investors assert claims large enough to threaten the 
sovereign creditworthiness of the destination country. On the contrary, for countries with high political 
constraints (and a low risk of expropriation of foreign investors), notification of an investor-friendly 
BIT is associated with 0.07% higher sovereign bond returns, indicating positive effects of BITs.  
 
The remainder is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 




A large branch of the literature deals with the impact of BITs on foreign direct investment (FDI). Early 
papers find only weak or no effects of BITs on FDI (e.g. UNCTAD (1998), Hallward-Driemeier (2003), 
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005), Gallagher and Birch (2006), Yackee (2008, 2009)). The majority of 
recent studies that find positive effects prevail (e.g. Banga (2003), Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), 
Salacuse and Sullivan (2005), Neumayer and Spess (2005), Kim (2007), Egger and Merlo (2007), Büthe 
and Milner (2009), Kerner (2009), Haftel (2010), Busse et al. (2010) Berger et al. (2011), Berger et al. 
(2013), Allee and Peinhardt (2011), Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2011), Dixon and Haslam (2016), 
Myburgh and Paniagua (2016), Frenkel and Walter (2019)). Only a few of these papers explicitly 
consider BITs between emerging markets (Banga (2003), Kim (2007), Dixon and Haslam (2016)). The 
majority of papers focus on treaties between a developed and less developed country (typically justified 
by the fact that FDI originating in less developed countries are negligible). 
 
Some papers argue that the quality of political constraints should help to prevent policy changes after 
BITs have been signed. Therefore, political constraints should have positive effects on FDI. Some 
authors include political constraints as control variable (Büthe and Milner (2009), Haftel (2010), Berger 
et al. (2013)). Others explicitly consider the interaction of BITs and political constraints (Busse et al. 
(2010), Neumayer and Spess (2005)). Myburgh and Paniagua (2016) find a greater effect for countries 
with weaker institutions. Overall, the literature offers inconclusive evidence for the relevance of political 
constraints. 
 
Other papers focus on the effect of the interplay of firm level characteristics and IIAs. Jandhyala and 
Weiner, (2014) show that multinational enterprises value investments higher when these are protected 
by IIAs. Furthermore, the authors show that firm characteristics also play a role by influencing a firm’s 
ability to benefit from investment protection. Therefore, the feasibility of arbitral proceedings is likely 




While most papers regarding BITs consider treaties as uniform, some papers take treaty provisions into 
account to explain different effects on FDI. Yackee (2008) categorizes BITs in accordance to the 
strength of investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, using sovereigns’ pre-consent to 
international arbitration. However, the author finds little to no effects on FDI. Berger et al. (2011) use 
the same approach and also find no robust effects on FDI. Berger et al. (2013) analyze the effects of 
BITs and regional trade agreements (RTAs) on FDI. The authors use the same classification for ISDS 
provision as previous papers, but additionally include the type of admission rules. To distinguish 
contracts with liberal admission rules, they examine the national treatment provision of treaties. Treaties 
that extend this provision to the pre-establishment phase of an investment are categorized as liberal. In 
line with previous studies, the authors do not find significant effects from ISDS provisions on FDI. 
However, they find positive effects from for liberal admission rules on bilateral FDI. Dixon and Haslam 
(2016) use a broader approach to consider treaty differences. The authors analyze the effect of various 
international investment agreements (IIAs) on FDI. To distinguish the strength of an IIA, they use a 
score based on thirteen different treaty provisions. In accordance to the achieved score, an IIA is 
categorized as weak, medium, or strong. Their analysis of FDI flows of American countries suggest that 
strong agreements promote FDI flows. Frenkel and Walter (2019) expand the existing literature by 
considering a rather broad measure of investor state dispute settlement (ISDS). Based on eight treaty 
provisions, the authors build a score to measure the strength of a BIT’s ISDS mechanism. Their analysis 
indicates that BITs will attract more FDI if ISDS provisions are stronger. 
 
A second relevant branch is the literature underscores the relevance of political factors for the 
determination of sovereign default risk. Since sovereign default is ultimately a political decision, 
political factors are important determinants for sovereign bond yields. Block and Vaaler (2004) find a 
political business cycle where perceived sovereign increases prior to elections as indicated by higher 
sovereign yield spreads and worse ratings. In a similar vein, Manasse and Roubini (2009) find that 
sovereign default risk increases prior to presidential elections, particularly for high levels of short term 
debt and rigid exchange rate regimes. 
 
Political stability and political constraints affect sovereign default risk. Saiegh (2009) finds that 
countries governed by a coalition of parties are less likely to reschedule their debts than countries ruled 
by single-party governments. Boubakri et al. (2011) find that sovereign yield spreads are higher in 
presidential systems (as compared to parliamentary systems). A government with control of all houses 
and large government majority in the parliament is associated with lower sovereign yield spreads. 
 
Vaaler et al. (2005) focus on the role of political ideology and find that sovereign bond yield spreads are 
higher in the run-up to a presidential election day if the market expects right-wing political incumbents 
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to be replaced by left-wing challengers, while lower bond yield spreads are observed when a left-wing 
government is expected to be replaced by a right-wing challenger. 
 
Breen and Mcmenamin (2013) find that higher levels of political polarization is associated with lower 
interest rates if concentration of political power is low, whereas political polarization increases interest 
rates when concentration is high. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2009) find that the impact of political 
and institutional conditions on sovereign default risk depends on macroeconomic conditions. In 
democratic regimes, parliamentary systems as well as many veto players reduce the likelihood of default 
on foreign debt, given that macroeconomic conditions are favorable. Eichler (2014) finds that sovereign 
yield spreads in countries with parliamentary systems and assembly elected presidents are higher than 
in presidential regimes. Interaction models reveal that sovereign yield spreads are more responsive to 
political determinants in autocratic regimes than in democratic countries. Eichler and Plaga (2017) 
reveal that US investors take political conditions into account when deciding on their foreign 
government bond holdings. They find that US investors reduce their government bond holdings in 
countries with high levels of political constraints and around elections. For the sample of countries with 
high default risk, US investors increase their government bond holdings in countries with high levels of 
political constraints, underlining their role in mitigating politically driven defaults. 
 
The literature on the political determinants of sovereign risk suggests that sovereign bond investors take 
political factors into account when pricing sovereign bonds and determining sovereign bond portfolios. 
High levels of political constraints are typically viewed as a device to mitigate the risk of politically 
driven defaults. In a similar manner, we expect that risk of expropriation is particularly high in countries 
with relatively unconstrained governments, and therefore the expected costs from arbitrations processes 
in investor-friendly BITs can be considered high.  
 
3 Data 
3.1 Dependent variable: Sovereign bond returns 
We use an unbalanced daily panel dataset for 25 emerging markets from 1993 to 2016 (see Table A1 
for the countries considered). Definitions and sources of variables are reported in Table A2 in the 
appendix. Summary statistics can be found in Table 1. 
 
To measure sovereign default risk, we use daily sovereign bond returns taken from JP Morgan’s 
Emerging Market Bond Index Global (EMBIG). The EMBIG includes US dollar denominated sovereign 
bonds, which rules out exchange rate risk. To be included in the EMBIG, individual bonds must meet 
minimum standards in terms of maturity and outstanding face value. The EMBIG has a broad and 
expanding coverage and is widely used to measure sovereign default risk in emerging markets. Our 
6 
 
sample starts with the introduction of the EMBI in 1993. Higher sovereign default risk (and the 
associated increase yield to maturity) is indicated by lower EMBIG returns.  
 
3.2 Three event dates of a BIT 
In order to measure the effects of BITs on sovereign bond returns, we consider three dates of a BIT’s 
life cycle: signature, notification, and entry into force. Typically, BITs are signed during state visits or 
at meetings of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or World Trade 
Organization (WTO). These events are usually accompanied by media attention and we can assume that 
the public learns about the existence and contents of treaties at these dates. However, when a BIT is 
signed it is not certain whether and when it will be ratified by both contracting countries, which lowers 
the informational value of the signing date. On average, it takes roughly two years between signature 
and entry into force of a BIT. However, the variation is large. For example, Morocco and Sweden signed 
a BIT in 1990, which entered into force in 2008. 
 
To bring a treaty into force, both contracting countries have to fulfill their respective constitutional 
requirements and ratify the treaty. Afterwards, contractual partners inform each other about the 
fulfillment of national requirements and confirm this to each other. This is usually done by letters of 
notification which are transmitted through diplomatic channels. The date a treaty enters into force 
depends on the arrival of the second letter. Some BITs come into effect immediately after the arrival of 
second notification, while others foresee a waiting period of several months. Accordingly, we do not 
expect much information to enter the market when a BIT comes into effect. Instead, we assume that new 
information enters the market with the arrival of the second notification. At this date, market participants 
learn that both countries ratified the treaty and the date it will come into effect is determined. 
 
We draw information on these dates from the International Investment Agreements Navigator 
(UNCTAD, 2020). This database provides information about the date of signature and the date a treaty 
enters into force. For example, China and Portugal signed a BIT on 9th of December 2005, which entered 
into force on 26th of July 2008. To gather information about the date of the second notification, we use 
treaty texts provided in the same database. Usually, BITs contain a paragraph concerning ratification 
and entry into force of the treaty. These paragraphs state whether the date where a treaty comes into 
effect is delayed from arrival of the second notification.1  
 
1 For example, the BIT between China and Portugal from 2005 states that the “Agreement shall enter into force on 
the thirtieth day following the receipt of the last notification in writing and through diplomatic channels, stating 
that all the internal procedures of both Parties have been fulfilled.” From this information we infer that the letter 
of the second notification arrived at 26th of June 2008. However, some treaties do not state a delay, while others 
stipulate a delay up to ninety days. However, we cannot figure out the date of the second notification for all treaties. 
Some BITs use a vague wording to describe the delay. For example, the BIT between Germany and the Philippines 
states “This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the second month following the date of the 
exchange of the German instruments of ratification and the Philippine notification of approval.” Such wording 




If one of the three events described above takes place on a weekend, we will use the next trading day as 
event date. The used events dates are available on request. Our empirical event dummies are constructed 
as a three-day window surrounding the event. Since some of these events took place in a row, we had to 
exclude several events due to overlapping event windows. 
 
3.3 Political risk 
To allow for heterogeneous effects of BITs on sovereign default risk, we include different proxy 
variables for political risk to account for the country specific risk of treaty violations, see Table 1 for 
summary statistics. The willingness of governments to violate treaties and to risk compensation claims 
from arbitration proceedings is likely to differ between countries.  
 
Since democratic regimes expropriate less frequently than autocratic regimes (Li, 2009), the political 
system of a country may shape the conditional impact of BITs on sovereign default risk. We therefore 
include polity2 score from Polity IV Database (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016). This score comprises 
different aspects of a country’s political system to a yearly indicator ranging from -10 to +10. Lower 
values indicate more autocratic regimes. Higher values indicate more democratic regimes. In our 
analysis, we use an autocracy dummy which is equal to 1 if a country’s polity 2 score is below the sample 
median (relatively autocratic) and 0 (relatively democratic) otherwise. 
 
However, as democratic governments also expropriate, this measure is rather crude. Li (2009) argues 
that the ability to expropriate also depends on political constraints. The effort to implement controversial 
policies, such as expropriations, is likely to increase with political constraints. A rarely constrained 
government might expropriate more likely than a government facing many veto players. We use the 
executive constraints index taken from the Polity IV Database (Marshall et al., 2016). The variable 
categorizes seven different levels of executive constraints on yearly basis. A value of one will be 
assigned if the authority of the executive is unlimited. A value of seven indicates that other players have 
equal or more power than the executive. We again create an executive constraints dummy, which is equal 
to 1 if the executive constraints index is below the sample median (low executive constraints) and 0 
(high executive constraints) otherwise. 
 
In addition, we include the political constraints index from Henisz (2002). The POLCON III index 
covers feasibility of political changes on a yearly basis. The index is based on a model that includes the 
number of independent branches of government, the alignment of these branches and the extend of 
preference heterogeneity within these branches. It scores from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more 
political constraints. We include a political constraints dummy which is equal to 1 if the POLCON III 




3.4 Heterogeneity of treaties 
We also account for the heterogeneity in the investor-friendliness of BITs. Some previous studies 
incorporate measures to distinguish the effectiveness of BITs. Yackee (2009) and Berger et al. (2013) 
focus on pre-consent to international arbitration. Frenkel and Walter (2019) use a broad measure to 
assess the strength of investor state dispute settlement provisions. Dixon and Haslam (2016) consider 
various provisions to assess the overall strength of a treaty. 
 
Given a lacking consensus in the literature about the most important treaty provisions, we take an 
agnostic approach and use treaty provisions that have been used most frequently in past arbitration 
proceedings. According to the Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator from UNCTAD (2020), the 
most frequently breached investment provisions are the following (in a descending order): fair and 
equitable treatment (FET), expropriation, prohibition of arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures (UAD), full protection and security (FPS), umbrella clause (UC), transfer of funds clause 
(ToF), national treatment (NT), and most favored nation treatment (MFN). Figure 1 shows the treaty 
clauses used in arbitral proceedings decided in favor of a foreign investor until 2016. FET and 
expropriation clauses are invoked in most cases. The other clauses play only a minor role. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
In order to classify the investor-friendliness of a BIT, we gather information from the International 
Investment Agreements Navigator (UNCTAD, 2020). For each provision, we construct a dummy 
variable indicating investor-friendliness. Some dummies indicate the existence of an investor-friendly 
clause, while others indicate an investor-friendly formulation of commonly used clauses.  
 
Based on information on single treaty clauses, we construct an investor-friendliness index for the BITs. 
We obtain this measure by adding up the dummy variable values of the eight treaty provisions to an 
overall score, ranging from 0 to 8. Based on this overall score, we derive an investor-friendliness dummy. 
This dummy variable is equal to 1, if a BIT’s investor-friendliness index scores above the sample median 
(investor-friendly BIT) and 0 (less investor-friendly BIT) otherwise. In the following, we present the 
used clauses and explain the construction of respective dummy variables. Summary statistics of the used 
clauses are presented in Table 1. 
 
The most frequently used clause in arbitral proceedings refers to the fair and equitable treatment. It 
obligates contracting parties to act reasonably without ambiguity, arbitrariness or discrimination 
(UNCTAD, 2012a). Many BITs contain such a clause, and all treaties in our sample do so. Therefore, 
we cannot distinguish contracts via the existence of such a clause. However, FET clauses may be 
qualified with a reference to international law or a list of specific elements which the clause applies for. 
The absence of such restrictions leads to a broader interpretation of the clause and eases its application 
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in arbitration proceedings. Thus, we presume that an unqualified FET clause is more beneficial to 
foreign investors. We will assign a value of 1 to the respective dummy variable if the clause is 
unqualified and a value of 0 if it is referenced to international law or limited to specific elements. 
 
Arbitral tribunals often deal with cases of expropriation. One can distinguish two types of expropriation: 
direct and indirect. The former refers to the mandatory transfer of private property to the state or a state-
mandated party or its physical seizure. The latter refers to deprivation of investments without a formal 
property transfer or outright seizure (UNCTAD, 2012b). Since the initial aim of BITs is the protection 
of investments in foreign countries, nearly all BITs include constraints for direct expropriations and we 
therefore cannot exploit this information. We rather focus on indirect expropriations. Due to its vague 
definition, protection against indirect expropriation is difficult and not every treaty mentions it 
explicitly. We assume that the mention of indirect expropriation indicates an easier application in 
arbitral proceedings. We assign a value of 1 to the respective dummy variable if indirect expropriation 
is mentioned and a value of 0 otherwise. 
 
Another frequently used provision in international arbitration aims at protection of foreign investment 
via prohibition of unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory measures. While there is no agreed 
definition of the concept, such provisions are aimed at increasing protection of investors (Kriebaum, 
2015). The corresponding dummy variable indicates whether treaties contain a standalone provision that 
prohibits unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory measures. 
 
The standard of full protection and security protects foreign investments from civil unrest, public 
disturbances or similar situations. It obligates contracting parties to compensate damages or losses 
resulting from those events (UNCTAD, 2005). The corresponding dummy variable indicates if a BIT 
contains a standard FPS clause. The dummy is 0 if the treaty does not contain such an obligation or the 
used clause is referenced to the domestic law. 
 
The umbrella clause obligates states to respect commitments and obligations from investment related 
contracts and other forms of agreements. Although arbitral tribunals have used different interpretations, 
this standard turns a breach of an investment contract potentially into a breach of a BIT and therefore 
extends applicability of BITs (UNCTAD, 2005). The corresponding dummy variable indicates treaties 
that contain this clause. 
 
The transfer of funds standard permits investors to transfer financial benefits arising from investments 
out of the country (UNCTAD, 2000). However, the applicability of the standard differs due to its 
interpretation by arbitral tribunals. Moreover, some treaties restrict the free transfer of funds in case of 
serious difficulties concerning the balance of payments or in case of other specific circumstances, such 
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as bankruptcy or criminal offences. We assume that contracts will be more investor-friendly if there are 
no exceptions from transfer of funds. The corresponding dummy variable indicates the absence of 
exceptions from the clause. 
 
Some treaty clauses concern granted rights of foreign investors compared to domestic investors or 
investors from other countries. These relations are usually determined by national treatment or most-
favored-nation treatment. National treatment means that a treatment of foreign investments shall not be 
less favorable than the one of domestic investments (UNCTAD, 1999). Most-favored-nation standard 
states that a treatment must be at least as favorable as it is for the most favored foreign investment 
(UNCTAD, 2010). Both standards can protect investments during the pre- or post-establishment phase 
of an investment or cover both. We expect that a longer coverage of these clauses is more favorable for 
foreign investors. Therefore, the corresponding dummy variables indicate whether the standard applies 
for both, the pre- and post-establishment phase of an investment. 
 
Summary statistics reported in Table 1 indicate that provisions on indirect expropriation, transfer of 
funds, and full protection and security are most frequently used in our sample of BITs, while national 
treatment and most-favored-nation treatment are rarely used. 
 
3.5 Control variables 
We include several control variables commonly used in the literature on sovereign default risk. The VIX 
index accounts for global risk factors. Market returns for global emerging market bonds are measured 
by daily returns of the EMBIG all countries index. We include domestic stock returns, in particular to 
account for positive effects of BITs such as an expected increase in economic growth. We include 
dummies for debt and currency crises taken from Laeven and Valencia (2018). The government debt to 
GDP ratio is taken from Abbas et al. (2010) and IMF (2018).  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 The baseline impact of BITs 
To assess the unconditional effects of BIT events on sovereign bond returns, we use the following fixed 
effects panel regression: 
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 ∗ 𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑗
 
+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜂𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ∑ 𝜃𝑞
𝑞
+ 𝑖𝑡  ,          
(1) 
where daily sovereign bond returns of country i at day t are regressed on the event dummy, BITit 
(indicating the 3-day window surrounding signature, notification or entry into force of a BIT), country-
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specific control variables, Controlsjit, and global control variables, Controlskt. Country fixed effects 𝛾𝑖 
are used to control time-invariant country-specific determinants of sovereign bond returns. Year fixed 
effects 𝜂𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 are included to control for global trends. Weekday fixed effects θq account for weekday 
specific investment patterns. The error term is represented by 𝑖𝑡. We use heteroscedasticity- and 
autocorrelation-robust standard errors that are clustered on the country level. 
 
Table 2 reports the estimation results of the baseline model (Equation 1), for signature, notification and 
entry into force of a BIT. The coefficient on signature is insignificant. With the signature the existence 
of the BIT becomes public, but it remains unclear whether the contract will ever come into effect. Both 
countries have to ratify the treaty before it can enter into force. Likewise, the coefficient on entry into 
force of a treaty is also insignificant. After notification, investors are aware that the BIT is ratified and 
will enter into force. Therefore, it is not surprising that the date of entry into force shows no 
informational value in our regression. The coefficient on the date of notification is also insignificant. In 
the fourth specification, we include all BIT event dummies in the model, and detect a weakly significant 
negative impact of BIT notifications on sovereign bond returns. During the three trading days around 
notification, sovereign bond returns are reduced by 0.034%. The negative impact of the BIT notification 
suggests that investors anticipate net negative effects on sovereign creditworthiness due to the legal risk 
of compensation claims. The relatively small magnitude may be explained by the heterogeneity of BITs 
in our sample. We expect that legal risk originating from a BIT is a function of political risk and the 
investor-friendliness of the BIT. Legal risk should particularly be high for countries with unconstrained 
governments signing investor-friendly BITs. Since the baseline results do not account for the 
heterogeneity across BITs and political systems, the average estimated impact is rather small. 
 
The notification date appears to inhibit the greatest informational value, since after notification it 
becomes apparent that the BIT is ratified and will be implemented. The signature appears not to be a 
relevant pricing factor, probably due to the uncertainty if the BIT will eventually enter into force. The 
actual entry into force also appears to have no informational value since the implementation decision 
has already been made at the earlier notification date.  
 
Given these baseline results, we use the notification as the relevant date for measuring the pricing impact 
of BITs in our interaction models. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The results for the control variables are largely in line with previous findings in the literature. Higher 
market returns measured using daily returns of the EMBIG all countries index are associated with higher 
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sovereign bond returns. A higher VIX, indicating increasing uncertainty, is surprisingly associated with 
higher sovereign bond returns. 
 
Higher domestic stock returns indicate improving economic and financial market conditions and are 
associated with significantly increased sovereign bond returns. Domestic stock returns are particularly 
meant to control for the positive effects of BIT events via economic growth and additional tax revenues 
and thus help to identify the legal risks associated with BITs. 
 
The negative coefficient on the sovereign debt crisis dummy suggests that average daily sovereign bond 
returns are around 0.3% lower during sovereign debt crises. Currency crises dummy appear to have no 
significant effects.  
 
4.2 The impact of BITs conditional on political risk 
The baseline results revealed a small average impact of BITs notification on sovereign bond returns. In 
this section, we use interaction models to test the pricing impact of BIT notification conditional on the 
political risk of the destination country government. A potential negative effect of BITs on sovereign 
creditworthiness stems from the fact that the destination country government may face compensation 
claims when breaching treaty provisions, such as by expropriating foreign investors. We exploit the 
cross-country heterogeneity of political risk measures to evaluate the ex-ante likelihood of such 
liabilities and apply an interaction model to test the conditional pricing impact of BIT notification: 
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼1𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑗
+ 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜂𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ∑ 𝜃𝑞
𝑞
+ 𝑖𝑡  , 
(2) 
where the 𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  notification dummy is interacted with a 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 dummy, indicating high 
political risk if 1 and low risk otherwise. 
 
Table 3 presents estimation results of the interaction model (Equation 2) using different measures of 
political risk. Relatively autocratic governments face low levels of executive or political constraints. 
Such governments appear to be more likely to breach treaty provisions for political reasons than 
governments in democratic countries with many veto players and executive constraints. BITs signed 
with these politically risky governments may therefore be associated higher expected liabilities from 
arbitration proceedings and therefore should have a more pronounced impact on sovereign default risk. 
The results do not support this hypothesis as none of the estimated interaction terms reveals significantly 
negative effects. Thus, bond investors appear not to judge the expected costs of BITs on sovereign 
creditworthiness based on political risk of the destination country government alone. Using triple 
interaction models in the next section we analyze the pricing impact of BITs conditional on political risk 
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of the domestic government and the investor-friendliness of the BIT. In the following models we use 
the executive constraints dummy as our baseline indicator for political risk. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
4.3 The impact of BITs on sovereign bond returns conditional on political risk and 
investor-friendliness of BITs 
So far, we have implicitly assumed that BITs are uniform. However, treaties differ in terms of investor-
friendliness, depending on the respective treaty provision. To take different provisions into account, we 
use the following triple interaction model: 
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼1𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡  
+𝛼4𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟˗f𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑦 𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟˗f𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑦 𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 r𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑗
+ 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜂𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ∑ 𝜃𝑞
𝑞
+ 𝑖𝑡  , 
(3) 
where we interact our dummies for BIT notification, low executive constraints and investor-friendliness. 
 
The first column of Table 4 presents the estimation results of Equation 3 using the score of the investor-
friendliness index and the executive constraints dummy. The results robustly confirm our hypothesis. 
The significantly negative triple interaction term reveals that investor-friendly BITs reduce sovereign 
bond returns if the government faces low constraints. Such governments have more leeway to 
expropriate foreign investors with negative implications for potential compensation claims and 
sovereign creditworthiness. In the case of high constraints (and the associated low risk of expropriation), 
investor friendly BITs increase sovereign bond returns.  
 
The second column presents the same model, but includes a dummy variable for investor-friendliness 
(rather than the score). Again, the negative triple interaction term reveals that investor friendly BITs will 
reduce sovereign bond returns if executive constraints are low. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 presents marginal effects of BIT notification on sovereign bond returns conditional on investor-
friendliness of treaties and the executive constraints of the government. Sovereign bond returns increase 
significantly, if countries with high executive constraints enter into an investor-friendly treaty. The 
marginal effect of such an investor-friendly treaty is + 0.07%, which accounts for roughly 8% of the 
standard deviation of daily bond returns. Investor-friendly BITs may attract FDI and support economic 
development with positive effects on sovereign creditworthiness. In this high political constraints 
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regime, the government will less likely breach BIT provisions and therefore investors expect lower 
compensation claims from arbitral proceedings. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
The impact of an investor-friendly BITs turns out to be negative in low executive constraints regimes. 
In this case, the marginal effect of an investor-friendly treaty on sovereign bond returns is roughly 
- 0,14%, which accounts for 15% of daily sovereign bond returns’ standard deviation. Low executive 
constraints increase the likelihood that the government directly or indirectly expropriates foreign 
investors for political reasons. Investor-friendly BITs facilitate a foreign investors’ ability to claim 
compensation for their losses using arbitral tribunals. The implementation of investor-friendly BITs in 
countries with low executive constraints will therefore be associated with higher expected costs from 
compensation claims and a negative effect on sovereign bond returns. 
 
4.4 The impact of BITs on sovereign bond returns conditional on political risk, 
investor-friendliness of BITs, and market size 
In the next step, we investigate the role of market size for the impact of BITs on sovereign bond returns. 
A treaty between a small destination country, and a large home country may amplify the legal risk 
channel for the destination country. Large foreign investment received from the home country increases 
the potential size of compensation claims for the destination country government. Also, companies of 
large home countries with their larger legal departments and better political connections may be better 
able to enforce their claims using the arbitration scheme. 
 
To investigate this issue, we perform a sample split. We use the ratio of home country GDP to destination 
country GDP and split the sample at the median of the ratio. Estimation results are presented in Table 
6. The first (second) column reports the results for the subset of observations where the home to 
destination country GDP ratio is above (below) the sample mean. The results reveal that the triple 
interaction term is much larger (in absolute terms) for the large home/destination country sample. This 
result indicates that the legal risk channel, constituted for investor-friendly BITs and low constrained 
governments, is more pronounced for BITs between large home countries and small destination 
countries. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
We present the marginal effects of BITs on sovereign bond returns for both sub samples in Table 7. The 
upper (lower) panel shows the results for the subset of observations where the home to destination 
country GDP ratio is above (below) the sample mean. For the large home to destination country set, the 
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implementation of an investor-friendly BIT in low executive constrains countries reduces sovereign 
bond returns by -0.22%. The corresponding effect for the small home to destination country set is only 
at -0.05% and statistically not different from 0. These results indicate that the legal risk channel of BITs 
is more pronounced for BITs where the destination country is large relative to the destination country. 
Bond investors appear to take the size of potential compensation claims into account when pricing the 
legal risk premium. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper studies the impact of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on sovereign bond returns for 25 
emerging markets in the period 1993-2016. We find a small unconditional impact of BITs on sovereign 
bond returns. While the date of signature and entry into force of BITs show no informational value for 
bond pricing, the date of notification reveals a significantly negative pricing impact on sovereign bonds. 
We further show that the effect of BITs on sovereign bond returns depends on executive constraints and 
investor-friendliness of treaties. Low executive constraints increase the risk of politically motivated 
expropriations and may therefore trigger more arbitration cases. The investor-friendliness of BITs on 
the other hand determines the degree to which the BIT actually facilitates arbitration proceedings. We 
categorized BITs according to eight different treaty provisions that have been used frequently in arbitral 
proceedings. Interaction models reveal that the implementation of investor-friendly BITs in countries 
with low executive constraints are associated with a significant reduction in sovereign bond returns, 
which accounts for roughly 15% of the standard deviation of daily returns. For country pairs with large 
home countries and small destination countries, this legal risk effect is even more pronounced. Sovereign 
bond investors appear to take potential compensation payments and reputation losses from arbitral 
proceedings into account when judging the effects of BITs. In countries with low executive constraints 
treaties with high investment protection might cause arbitral proceedings that threaten sovereign’s 
creditworthiness. In countries with high executive constraints the politically motivated expropriations 
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Table 2: Unconditional effects of signature, notification and entry into force dummies on sovereign bond 
returns 
 I II III IV 
Signature dummy 0.041   0.041 
 (0.034)   (0.034) 
Notification dummy  -0.029  -0.034* 
  (0.020)  (0.019) 
Entry into force dummy   -0.001 0.012 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
∆ln EMBIG all countries index 0.716*** 0.716*** 0.716*** 0.716*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
∆VIX 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
∆ln Domestic stock indices 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Debt to GDP 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Currency crisis dummy -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Sovereign debt crisis dummy -0.294** -0.293** -0.293** -0.294** 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) 
Constant -0.051* -0.048* -0.049* -0.051* 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
Observations 77445 77445 77445 77445 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 
Included BITs 394 335 413 1142 
R-squared overall 0.281 0.281 0.281 0.281 
R-squared within 0.281 0.281 0.281 0.281 
R-squared between 0.077 0.081 0.080 0.077 
Notes: All regressions include country, year, and weekday fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the 
country level and are depicted in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** which denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
Table 3: The effects of BIT notification on sovereign bond returns conditional on political risk  
 I II II 
    
Notification dummy -0.002 0.007 -0.038 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) 
Autocracy dummy 0.006   
 (0.007)   
Notification *Autocracy dummy -0.075   
 (0.080)   
Low executive constraints dummy  0.024**  
  (0.011)  
Notification * Low executive constraints dummy  -0.093  
  (0.077)  
Political constraints dummy   -0.008 
   (0.005) 
Notification * Political constraints dummy   0.019 
   (0.049) 
    
Observations 77445 77445 77445 
Number of countries 25 25 25 
Included BITs 335 335 335 
R-squared overall 0.281 0.281 0.281 
R-squared within 0.281 0.281 0.281 
R-squared between 0.098 0.083 0.066 
Notes: All regressions include ∆ln EMBIG all countries index, ∆VIX, ∆ln domestic stock index, debt to GDP, 
sovereign debt crisis dummy, currency crisis dummy, and a constant as well as country, year, and weekday fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered on the country level and are depicted in parentheses. Significance levels 




Table 4: The effects of BIT notification on sovereign bond returns conditional on low executive 
constraints and investor-friendliness of treaties  
 I II 
   
Notification dummy -0.108** -0.040* 
 (0.051) (0.021) 
Low executive constraints 0.024** 0.024** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Notification dummy * Low executive constraints 0.111 0.002 
 (0.141) (0.078) 
Investor-friendliness index 0.028*  
 (0.014)  
Notification dummy * Low executive constraints * Investor-friendliness index -0.047*  
 (0.027)  
Investor-friendliness dummy  0.111*** 
  (0.039) 
Notification dummy * Low executive constraints * Investor-friendliness dummy  -0.212*** 
  (0.068) 
   
Observations 77445 77445 
Number of countries 25 25 
Included BITs 335 335 
R-squared overall 0.281 0.281 
R-squared within 0.281 0.281 
R-squared between 0.083 0.081 
Notes: All regressions include ∆ln EMBIG all countries index, ∆VIX, ∆ln domestic stock index, debt to GDP, 
sovereign debt crisis dummy, currency crisis dummy, and a constant as well as country, year, and weekday fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered on the country level and are depicted in parentheses. Significance levels 
are indicated by *, **, and *** which denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
Table 5: Marginal effects of the notification of a BIT on sovereign bond returns conditional on 
executive constraints and investor-friendliness 
   Investor-friendly treaty Difference    No Yes 
Executive constraints 
High -0.040* 0.071* 0.111*** (0.021) (0.036) 0.039 
Low -0.038 -0.139* -0.101* (0.068) (0.075) (0.055) 
Notes: Marginal Effects base on regression results from column II of Table 4. Standard errors are clustered on 
the country level and are depicted in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** which 






Table 6: The effects of BIT notification on sovereign bond returns conditional on low executive 
constraints and investor-friendliness of treaties – sample split 
 I II 
   
Notification dummy -0.044 -0.037 
 (0.038) (0.022) 
Low executive constraints 0.025** 0.023* 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Notification dummy * Low executive constraints -0.073 0.058 
 (0.158) (0.039) 
Investor-friendliness dummy 0.128** 0.084 
 (0.054) (0.050) 
Notification dummy * Low executive constraints * Investor-friendliness dummy -0.235** -0.153* 
 (0.108) (0.086) 
   
Observations 77445 77445 
Number of countries 25 25 
Included BITs 168 167 
R-squared overall 0.281 0.281 
R-squared within 0.281 0.281 
R-squared between 0.082 0.080 
Notes: The first (second) column reports the results for the subset of observations where the home to destination 
country GDP ratio is above (below) the sample mean. All regressions include ∆ln EMBIG all countries index, 
∆VIX, ∆ln domestic stock index, debt to GDP, sovereign debt crisis dummy, currency crisis dummy, and a 
constant as well as country, year, and weekday fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the country level 
and are depicted in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** which denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
Table 7: Marginal effects of BIT notification conditional on executive constraints and investor-
friendliness – sample split 
GDP ratio above the sample median  
 Investor-friendly treaty Difference No Yes 
Executive constraints 
High -0.044 0.084 0.128** (0.038) (0.057) (0.054) 
Low -0.117 -0.225* -0.108 (0.141) (0.108) (0.093) 
GDP ratio below the sample median  
 Investor-friendly treaty Difference No Yes 
Executive constraints 
High -0.037 0.048 0.084 (0.022) (0.041) (0.050) 
Low 0.021 -0.048 -0.069 (0.031) (0.053) (0.071) 
Note: Marginal Effects base on regression results from column I and II of Table 6. Standard errors are clustered 
on the country level and are depicted in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** which 






Table A1: Countries in the sample 
Country  Start date End date Signature Notification Entry into force 
Argentina ARG 03jan1994 31dec2002 27 14 27 
Bulgaria BGR 03oct2000 29dec2006 3 9 11 
Chile CHL 31may1999 31dec2012 8 14 12 
China CHN 01apr1994 31dec2013 52 18 47 
Colombia COL 03mar1997 30dec2016 13 6 8 
Ecuador ECU 02jan1995 31dec1999 7 8 14 
Egypt EGY 01aug2001 31dec2010 7 13 14 
Croatia HRV 03jan1997 31dec2003 19 21 24 
Hungary HUN 03jan2000 31dec2008 7 13 14 
Indonesia IDN 31may2004 31dec2009 3 5 4 
Morocco MAR 01jan1999 30dec2016 19 10 12 
Mexico MEX 03jan1994 30dec2016 28 22 26 
Malaysia MYS 01jan1997 30dec2011 5 11 10 
Nigeria NGA 01jan1999 31oct2006 8 4 5 
Pakistan PAK 01jan2002 31dec2010 0 4 4 
Panama PAN 03jan2000 29dec2006 5 5 6 
Peru PER 04jan1994 31dec2010 17 22 23 
Philippines PHL 03jan1994 29dec2006 20 14 20 
Poland POL 02mar1994 31dec1999 8 14 14 
Russian Federation RUS 02jan1995 30dec2016 32 23 25 
Serbia SRB 01jan2007 31dec2015 8 10 10 
Turkey TUR 01jan1997 31dec2013 47 42 44 
Ukraine UKR 01jan2001 31dec2015 10 8 8 
Venezuela VEN 01jan1996 31dec2009 12 14 14 
South Africa ZAF 01jan1997 31dec2010 29 11 17 





Table A2: Definition and sources of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
∆ln EMBIG The respective country index of JP Morgan’s 
Emerging Market Bond Index Global. Daily 




Signature  Date on which two countries signed a treaty. If 
the event took place on the weekend, we use 
the next trading day. 




Notification Date on which both countries have confirmed 
the fulfillment of the respective constitutional 
requirements that are necessary for the entry 
into force of the BIT. This date is determined 
using the date of entry into force and the 
waiting period between notification and entry 
into force. The waiting period was taken from 
the respective treaty texts. 
If the event took place on the weekend, we use 
the next trading day. 
The treaty texts as provide by 




Entry into force Date on which a BIT enters into force. If the 
event took place on the weekend, we use the 
next trading day. 





Polity2 score Indicator variable characterizing the political 
system; indicator ranges from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) 
Polity IV Database 
(Marshall et al., 2016) 
Executive constraints Indicator variable characterizing constraints 
on an executive; indicator ranges from 1 
(unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or 
subordination) 
Polity IV Database 
(Marshall et al., 2016) 
Political constraints Indicator for the capacity of the government to 
implement policy change; indicator ranges 




Investment provisions of BITs 
FET dummy The Dummy variable is 1 if a BIT contains an 
unqualified fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
clause. The variable is 0 if the FET clause has 
a reference to international law or is limited to 
specific elements 
Investment Policy Hub – 
International Investment 
Agreements Navigator – Mapping 
of IIA Content (UNCTAD, 2020) 
Indirect expropriation 
dummy 
The Dummy variable is 1 if a BIT’s 
expropriation clause mentions indirect 
expropriations. The variables is 0 if indirect 
expropriations are not mentioned. 
Investment Policy Hub –  
International Investment 
Agreements Navigator – Mapping 
of IIA Content (UNCTAD, 2020) 
UAD dummy The Dummy variable is 1 if a BIT contains a 
prohibits the impairment of investments by 
unreasonable and/or arbitrary and/or 
discriminatory (UAD) measures. 
The variable is 0 if the treaty does not contain 
such a clause. 
Investment Policy Hub – 
International Investment 
Agreements Navigator – Mapping 
of IIA Content (UNCTAD, 2020) 
FPS dummy The Dummy variable is 1 if a BIT contains a 
standard full protection and security (FPS) 
clause. If the BIT does not contain a FPS 
clause or the clause is referenced to the 
domestic law the dummy variable will be 0. 
Investment Policy Hub – 
International Investment 
Agreements Navigator – Mapping 
of IIA Content (UNCTAD, 2020) 
UC dummy The dummy variable is 1 if a BIT contains an 
umbrella clause (UC). The variable is 0 if the 
treaty does not contain an umbrella clause. 
Investment Policy Hub – 
International Investment 
Agreements Navigator – Mapping 
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of IIA Content (UNCTAD, 2020) 
ToF dummy The dummy variable is 1 if the transfer of 
funds (ToF) clause in a BIT does not contain 
any exceptions. The dummy is 0 if the clause 
is restricted. Some treaties allow to restrict free 
transfer of funds due to balance of payments 
difficulties. Other treaties provide a list of 
specific exceptions. 
Investment Policy Hub – 
International Investment 
Agreements Navigator – Mapping 
of IIA Content (UNCTAD, 2020) 
MFN dummy This dummy is 1 if the most-favored-nation 
(MFN) clause of a BIT applies at the pre- and 
post-establishment phase of an investment. 
The Dummy is 0 if the clause only covers the 
pre-establishment phase. 
Investment Policy Hub – 
International Investment 
Agreements Navigator – Mapping 
of IIA Content (UNCTAD, 2020) 
NT dummy This dummy is 1 if the national treatment (NT) 
clause of a BIT applies at the pre- and post-
establishment phase of an investment. The 
Dummy is 0 if the clause only covers the pre-
establishment phase. 
Investment Policy Hub – 
International Investment 
Agreements Navigator – Mapping 
of IIA Content (UNCTAD, 2020) 
Control variables 
∆ln EMBI all countries The all countries index of JP Morgan’s 
Emerging Market Bond Index Global. Daily 
returns are computed as differences of natural 
logarithms. 
DataStream 
∆VIX Weighted average of the implied volatilities of 
eight put and call options written on the S&P 
500 index. Daily returns are computed as 
differences of natural logarithms. 
Chicago Board Options Exchange, 
DataStream 
∆ln Domestic stock 
indices 
Daily returns of US$ denominated national 
stock indices. The information was collected 
from different providers. For some countries 
we had to use national currency indices. Daily 
returns are computed as differences of natural 
logarithms 
DataStream Total Market Country 
Indices; S&P BMI (USD), MSCI, 
National Stock Indices 
Currency crisis dummy Dummy variable that indicates if countries 
face a currency crisis.  
Laeven and Valencia (2018) 
Sovereign debt crisis 
dummy 
Dummy variable that indicates if countries 
face a sovereign debt crisis.  
Laeven and Valencia (2018) 
Debt to GDP Data on public debt in percent to GDP from 
Abbas et al. (2010). Recent years appended 
with information on general government gross 
debt as percent of GDP from IMF (2018). 
Abbas et al. (2010); IMF (2018) 
 
